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For the past twenty-five years or so, there has been a running dispute between 
literary critics and linguists on the question of whether it is appropriate to apply 
linguistic methods -that is to say, methods derived from the discipline of 
linguistics- to the study of l i terature. There has been almost universal 
confidence among the linguistis that this activity is entirely justified; and almost 
universal resistance by the critics, who have regarded the exercise with almost 
moral indignation. In this unyielding dispute, the claims and denials on both 
sides have been voiced with great forcé and passion. Here is Román Jakobson 
putting the linguist's case, in 1958: 
Poetics deals with probiems of verbal structure, just as the analysis of painting is concerned with 
pictorical structure. Since linguistics is the global science of verbal structure, poetics may be 
regarded as an integral part of linguistics! 1 ]. 
But the critics will not have this. In a long, bitter controversy between the late F. 
W. Bateson and myself in 1967, the counterargument against linguistics was 
based essentially on an allegation of unfitness. Linguistics is a science, claims 
Bateson, but literature has what he calis an "ineradicable subjective core" which 
is inaccessible to science. Again, linguistic processing is only a preliminary to 
literary response, so the linguist is incapable of taking us far enough in an 
account of literary form and experience. Finally, here is a dismissive opposition 
formulated by David Lodge, which is really saying that never the twain shall 
meet: 
One still feels obliged to assert that the discipline of linguistics will never replace literary 
criticism.or radically change the bases ofits claims to be a useful and meaningful form of human 
inquiry. It is the essential characteristic of modera linguistics that it claims to be a science. It is 
the essential characteristic of literature that itconcerns valúes. And valúes are not amenable to 
scientific method[2J. 
The opposition between science and valúes is at the heart of the refusal to agree; 
it manifests itself in different specific forms in many distinct arguments among 
protagonists for the two cases. What I would like you to note in this contribution 
by Lodge is the way in which the key terms, * science' and * valúes,' are felt to be 
self-explanatory and conclusive. Lodge, like most of the debaters on both sides, 
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requires us to take the central t e rms on t rus t , to accept them in the i r 
commonsense meanings with their ordinary valúes presupposed. In effect, Lodge 
is perceiving the two disciplines in terms of sterotypes, rather than analysing 
carefully the terms and concepts involved in the comparison. I do not say that 
Lodge is especially culpable, merely that this statement of his is characteristic of 
this habit, in the debate, of relying on undefined and sterotypical terms. Both 
sides are guilty of this. 
I realised a long time ago that I must stop adding fuel to this dispute; since the 
confrontation was conducted in conditions of quite inadequate theorization, it 
was impossible to particípate in it as a reasoned debate. Without getting 
envolved in the controversy again, 1 would like to merely mention some common 
failures of theorization which render it impossible to deal sensibly with a 
question so naively formulated as can linguistics be applied to literature?' 
1. A major difficulty, on both sides, is a completely uncritical understanding of 
what is meant by ~ linguistics.' The literary critics make no allowance for the fact 
that there exist different linguistic theories with quite distinct characteristics. 
While it might be true of linguistic model * A' that it can or cannot carry out some 
particular function of criticism, the same might not be true of model ~B' which 
has a different scope or a different manner of proceeding. If the critics are not 
well enough informed to discrimínate between models, the linguists do not 
acknowledge the distinctions; a linguist will work on literature in terms of the 
theory s/he happens to uphold as the ' c o r r e c t ' theory . Such is the 
competitiveness of the schools of linguistics that a devotee of one theory will not 
acknowledge that a rival might have some advantages for the task in hand. 
2. A second persistent fallacy about linguistics, again represented on both sides, 
concerns the analytic modus operandi of linguistic method. It will be clear 
from what 1 have just said that different models have quite diverse aims, and 
procedures towards those aims. One model may have the purpose of accounting 
for the s tructure of particular texts; another may focus on sociolinguistic 
variation; another may be concerned to increase our knowledge about linguistic 
universals; and so on. 
But there is a common misconception that linguistics -any linguistics- is a kind 
of automatic analyzing device which, fed a text, will output a description without 
human intervention. (The critics of course regard this as a soullessly destructive 
process, a cruelty to poems, but that is simply an emotional over-reaction based 
on a misconception). Now whatever differences there are between contemporary 
linguistic theories, I think they would all agree with Chomsky's insistence that 
linguistics is not a discovery procedure. Linguistic analysis works only in 
relatioh to what speakers know already, or what linguists hypothesize in 
advance. So the whole range of objections to linguistics on the grounds that it is 
merely a mechanical procedure can be dismissed; linguistic analysis is a flexible, 
directed operation completly under the control of its users, who can direct it to-
wards any goals which are within the scope of the model being used. Complete 
human control is possible if you carefully theorize the nature of your objetive, 
and the nature of the object you are studying. 
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Which leads to mention a second set of deficiencies in the way linguistic 
criticism is theorized, and then to the more positive part of my argument. 
Even if critics and linguists positively acknowledge that language is of 
fundamental importance to the structure of the literary text, there is no 
guarantee that they will present language in a realistic and illuminating way. 
There are three representations of language that I regard as particularly unhelp-
ful, and I will briefly instance them by reference to the work of scholars whose 
commitment to language is undoubted and substantial. 
1. The first problematic attitude is that which regards language in literature as 
an object. This position is implicit throughout the work of Román Jakobson[3]. 
Jakobson's "poetic function' claims that the important thing about literature is 
the way in which structure is organised to foreground the substantive elements 
of the text -in particular, phonology and syntax. The patterns of parallelism and 
equivalents which he finds in his poems, at these levéis of language, bulk out the 
formal structure, e. g. metrical and stanzaic structure, so that the text is re-
presented as if its main mode of existence were perceptible physical form. The 
cost of th is imaginary process is minimizat ion of what we might cal i 
communicative and interpersonal -in a word, pragmatic-functions of the text. 
As I shall show in a moment, it is exactly these pragmatic dimensions which give 
the richest significance for critical studies. It is a pity that this 'objective' theory 
of language in literature should have been given currency by such a brilliant and 
influential l ingüistas Jakobson. 
2. A second unhelpful attitude to language is that which treats it as a médium 
through which literature is transmitted. Here I quote David Lodge again: 'The 
novelist's médium is language: whatever he does, qua novelist, he does in and 
through language'[4]. Presumably language as a médium is analogous to paint, 
bronze or celluloid for other arts. But the metaphor easily comes to mean 'only a 
médium': the real thing is the novel (or poem, etc.) which is conveyed in and 
through' the médium. Thus the substance of literature is shifted into some 
obscure and defined, sphere of existence which is somehow beyond language. But 
for linguistics, l i terature is language, to be theorized just like any other 
discourse; it makes no sense to degrade the language to a mere médium, since the 
meanings, themes, larger structures of a text, ' l i terary' or not, are uniquely 
constructed by the text in its interrelation with social and other contexts. This 
position is difficult for literary critics to swallow, because it appears to remove 
the claimed special status (and valué) of literature, to reduce it to the level of the 
language of the marketplace. But this levelling is essential to linguistic 
criticism if the whole range of insights about language provided by linguistics is 
to be made available. We want tó show that a novel or a poem is a complexly 
structured text; that its structural form, by social semiotic processes, constitutes 
a representation of a world, characterized by activities and states and valúes; 
that this text is a communicative interaction between its producer and its con-
sumers , within re levant social and inst i tut ional contexts. Now these 
characteristics of the novel or poem are no more that what functional linguistics 
is looking for in studying, say, conversations or letters or official documents. 
Perhaps this is a richer and thus more acceptable characterization of the aims of 
linguistic analysis than literary critics usually expect. But for me at any rate, 
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this is what theorization as language involves. No abstract literary properties 
'beyond' the médium need to be postulated, for the rhetorical and semiotic 
p rope r t i e s in ques t ion should appea r wi th in an o rd ina ry l ingu i s t i c 
characterization, unless linguistics is conceived in too restricted a way. 
3. Implicit in what I have just said is my reluctance to accept one further 
assumption about language which is widespread in stylistics and criticism. This 
is the belief that there is a distinct difference between poetic or literary language 
on the one hand and ordinary language on the other. Critics generally take for 
granted some versión of this distinction; and some linguists have attempted to 
demónstrate it: we find strong arguments to this effect in the writings of, for 
example, Jakobson and Mukarovsky. But these arguments are not empirically 
legitímate, and they are a serious obstacle to a linguistic criticism which at~ 
tempts to allow to literature the eommunicative fullness that is a common 
property of all language. 
I have given some reasons why the apparently simple question ~Can linguistics 
be applied to literature?' is unlikely to be satisfactorily answered. Because I 
believe that linguistics can very appropriately and revealingly be applied to 
literature, I want to re-orient the issue, in different terms. The solution is, it 
seems to me, to simply theorize literature as language, and to do this using the 
richest and most suitable linguistic model. 
To be adequate to this task, a linguistic model should possess the following 
broad characteristics. It should be comprehensive in accounting for the whoie 
range of dimensions of linguistic structure, particularly pragmatic dimensions. 
It should be capable of providing an account of the functions of given linguistic 
constructions (in real texts), particularly the thought-shaping (Halliday's 
" ideational') function. It should acknowledge the social basis of the formation of 
meanings (Halliday's "social semiotic')(5]. 
The requisite linguistics for our purpose unlike most other, artificially 
restricted, forms of linguistics, should aim to be comprehensive in offering a 
complete account of language structure and usage at all levéis: semanties, the 
organization of meanings within a language; syntax, the processes and orderings 
which arrange signs into the sentences of a language; phonology and phonetics, 
respectively the classification and ordering, and the actual articulation, of the 
sounds of speech; text-grammar, the sequencing of sentences in coherent 
extended discourse; and pragmatics, the conventional relationships between 
linguistic constructions and the users and uses of language. 
Pragmatics is a part of linguistics which is still very much subject to debate and 
development[6|, but it is clear that it includes roughly the following topics: the 
interpersonal and social acts that speakers perform by speaking and writing; 
thus, the structure of not only conversation but also of al! other sorts of linguistic 
communication as interaction; the diverse relationships between language use 
and its different types of context; particularly the relationships with social 
contexts and the historical development; fundamentally, the systems of shared 
knowledge within communities; and between speakers which make com-
munication possible -this is where pragmatics and semanties overlap. In various 
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writings I have stresscd the need in linguistic criticism lo mend the neglect of the 
interactional facéis of Miterary' texts: the rhetorical relationships between 
addressor and addressee, the dynamics of construction of fictional characters, 
and the sociolinguistic relationships between the producers and consumers of 
literature[7|. The second strand of pragmatics, concerning linguistic structure 
and systems of knowledge, will enrich linguistic criticism even more, and bring it 
into positive collaboration with literary criticism. 
A "functional" model of language workso.n the premise that linguistic 
structures are not arbitrary, ñor, as Chomsky claims, broadly constrained by 
universal properties of Mind. Rather, particular language structures assumed 
the forms they do in response to the communicative uses to which they are put, 
within a speech community. Malliday proposes three categories of ~ function': 
ideational, interpersonal, and textual. The ideational function is a key concept 
in linguistic criticism. The experience of individuáis, and, around them, their 
communities, is encoded in the language they use as sets of ideas; and the 
ideational will differ as the dominant ideas of speakers differ. A simple example 
would be the operational concepts of a science, coded for the relevant speakers in 
a technical terminology; for these speakers, the terminology is one part of the 
linguistic organization of their experience: though this is a specialized part of the 
ideational, a technical terminology is only an obvious instance of a general 
principie, namely that language s t ruc ture , in its ideational function, is 
constitutive of a speaker's experience of reality. 
And of a community's experience; this is what - social semiotic' means. 
Although, undoubtedly, some of the meanings encoded in language are natural 
in origin, reflecüng the kind of organism we are (e. g. basic colour, shape and 
direction terms)|8], most meanings are social: the dominant preoccupations, 
theories or ideologies of a community are coded in its language, so that the 
semantic structure is a map of the community's knowledge and its organization. 
An important development of this principie follows from the fact tha t 
communities are ideologiealiy diverse: the existence of complex and competing 
sets of ideas gives rise to diverse style, regis ters or var iet ies car ry ing 
semioticaüy distinct versions of reality according to the distinct views of in-
dividuáis and of sub-communities. For the critics, this is linguistic support for 
the traditional assumption (formulated by Leo Spitzer but implicit much more 
widely) that a style embodies a view of the world. The advanee in Ilaliiday's and 
my formulation is that the availability of a formal method of linguistic analysis 
fácilitates the unpicking of relationships between style and the representation of 
experience. 
I want now to look at a textual example; for economy of exposition, a very 
familiar passage. This will not ~prove the theory,' but it will suggest the 
directions in which this theory of language might take us. The extract is the 
opening of William Faulkner 's The Sound and the Fury, a familiar but 
striking example of the way in which language structure gives form to a view of 
the world: 
Through the f'ence, between the curling flower spaces, I couid see them hitting. They were 
commg towards where the fiag wat; and I went along the fence. Luster was hunting in the grass 
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by the flower tree. They Look the flag out, and they were hitting. Then Lhey put the flag back and 
they went. to the table, and he hit and the other hit. Then they went on, and they went along the 
(erice. Luster caine away f'rom the flower tree and we went along the f'ence and they stopped and 
we stopped and I looked through the f'ence while Luster was hunting ín the grass. 
' Mere, caddie." He hit. They went across the pasture. I held to the f'ence and watched themgoing 
away. 
Listen at you, now,' l.uster said. 'Ain't you something, thiity-three years oíd, going on that 
way. Aller 1 done went all the way to town to buy you that cake. Hush up that moaníng. Ain't 
you going to help me find that quarter so 1 can go to the show tonight?' 
They were hitting little, across the pasture. I went back along the f'ence to where the flag was. 
It flapped on the bright grass and trees. 
The character íVom whose poinlof view this parí of the narraüve is told is Benjy, 
a 33-year-old man with the mind of a young child. It is obvious that Faulkner 
has designed this language to suggest the limitations of Benjy's grasp of the 
world around him. Bul how does the reader arrive at this almost instinctive 
realizalion? There are some linguistic clues, and these are very suggestive, but 
by themselves they do not answer the question of how we give the passage the 
interpretation I have assigned to it. 
Starting with the language: although it is deviant, it is not disintegrated in a 
hapha/.ard fashion, but systematically patterned in certain áreas of structure. 
Two observations are relevant here. First, random deviance or self-consistent 
deviance were options for Faulkner; they could be considered different models of 
mental deficiency. Second, certain types of structure, through repeütion, are 
"foregrounded' (a process well known to stylisticians): foregrounding implies 
perceptual salience for readers, a pointer to áreas ofsignificance. 
Most striking is a consistent oddity in what linguists cali transitivity: the 
linguistic structuring of actions and events. In this passage there are almost no 
transitivo verbs; instead a preponderance of intransitives Ccoming,' 'went , ' 
"hunting,1 etc.) and one transitive ('hit') used repeatedly without an object as if it 
were intransitive. It is implied that Benjy has little sense of actions and their 
effeets on objects: a restricted notion of causation. 
Second, Benjy has no ñames for certain concepts which are crucial to his 
understanding of what he is witnessing. In certain cases the word is supressed 
entirely: notably, the word 'golf; in others he uses circumlocutions to desígnate 
objects for which he lacks a term: "the curling flower spaces,' "wherc the flag 
was,' "the flower tree.' The implication of this is that he has command of only a 
part of his society's classification of objects. 
Third, he uses pesonal pronouns in an odd way -look at the sequence 
"them...they...They...they...they...he...the other... ' Me uses these pronouns 
without identifying who he is referring to and with little variation in the 
pronoun forms themselves. It is suggested by this that Benjy does not appreciate 
what is needed if one wishes to specify to another person an object which one 
knows about but the other person does not. This would obviously be a severe 
eommunicative handicap. 
Forth, there is a problem with Benjy's deictic terms: the words used to point to 
and orient objects and actions. There are plenty of these deictics in the passage: 
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'Through...between...coming toward where...went along...'etc. Bul these words 
do not add up to a consistent and comprehensible picture of the positions and 
movements of Benjy himself, his companion Luster, and the golfers whom they 
are watching. Try drawing d iagrams of the sequence of positions and 
movements. Benjy is literally disoriented, with little sense of his location and of 
others' relationships with him within a context. The deictic inconsistency 
produces, for the reader, a sense of incoherence in the narrating, a feeling of 
being in the presence of a storyteller whose perceptions are disjointed. 
In each of the above four paragraphs I have first noted a recurrent linguistic 
construction, and then added an interpretative comment. The question arises 
(or ought to!) of what is the authority for these comments. Let us be clear that 
there are no mimetic considerations involved, and no question of objective 
criteria for ñdelity of representation: what reader could say I recognise this as 
an accurate rendering of the story-telling style of a person with such-and-such a 
cognitive disability'? and wouldn't this response anyway miss the point that 
language constructs fictions, rather than models reality? But it might be argued, 
on the * fiction-constructing' premise, that what happens here is precisely that 
the specific language of this text somehow creates Benjy's consciousness ab 
initio. This kind of argument, common in literary criticism, has never seemed to 
me very plausible; since linguistic forms come to the writer already loaded with 
significances, it is unlikely that words and sentences could be used to créate new 
meanings autonomously in a particular text. It is probable, then, that the 
significances here are conventional, but having said that it is necessary to define 
more precisely what is going on in the interaction between text, reader, and 
culture. At this stage of research, I cannot be absolutely exact, but can indícate 
something of the complexity of the processes. 
Functional grammar maintains that linguistic constructions are selected 
according to the communicative purposes that they serve. It can be assumed that 
the total linguistic resources available to a speaker have been cumulatively 
formed by the communicative practices of the society into which s/he is born, and 
then by the practices in which s/he participates during socialization. On this 
theory, an explanation of my phrase "loaded with significances' above would be 
that the linguistic units and structures available to an individual signify the 
associated functions: e. g. the word 'photosynthesis,' in addition to its dictionary 
meaning of a certain botanical life-process has the association of a scientific 
register of language; "once upon a time' signifies narrative for children; and so 
on. If it were as simple as this, each individual would possess, in addition to 
his/her semantic and syntactic and phonological competence, a kind of 
"pragmatic dictionary' in which the communicative and social significancies of 
forms were reliably stored. This would, of course, differ from individual to 
individual depending on their communicative roles within society, but with very 
substantial overlap. 
The catch with this model is that linguistic forms may be pragmatically, as well 
as semantically, ambiguous. There is not an invariant relationship between 
form and function. So the linguistic critic, like the ordinary reader or hearer, 
cannot just recognise the linguistic structure and consulting his pragmatie 
competence, assign a significance to it. A more realistic view of linguistic 
87 
interaction is that we process text as discourse, that is, as a unified whole of text 
and context -rather than as structure with function attached. We approach the 
text with a hypothesis about a relevant context, based on our previous experi-
ences of relevant discourse, and of relevant contexts: this hypothesis helps us to 
point an interpretation, to assign significances, which are confirmed or 
disconfirmed or modified as the discourse proceeds. In the case of face-to-face 
interaction in conversation, feedback occurs to assist the refining of the hypo-
thesis; with written texts, we are reliant on our existing familiarity with 
relevant modes of discourse and on our skill (developed in literary education and 
in other conscious studies of discourse, e. g. sociolinguistics) at b r inging 
appropiate discourse models to bear. As critics know, the reader's realization of a 
literary text as discourse takes reading and re-reading, on the basis of the 
máximum possible previous experience of the canon of literature and of other 
relevant discourse; to assist this process and to affirm up our hypotheses, 
discussion with other experienced readers of literature is invaluable. 
I am not an expert on Faulkner, and can only suggest the direction in which the 
analysis might go. The features noted can be traced in other texts which 
characterize various limitations of cognitive ability or of experience. For 
example, similar peculiarities of transitivity have been noted by Halliday in the 
language which depicts the thought-processes of William Golding's Neandertal 
Man Lok in his novel The Inheritors, and has interpreted them, as I have done 
here, as suggestions of a weak grasp of causationl9|. Circumlocutions like 
Benjy's "the flower tree' are examples of a process called underlexicalization 
which is common in the characterization of na'íve, inexperienced people; cfr. my 
comments on Kingsley Amis's treatment of his provincial heroine Jenny Bunn in 
T a k e a Girl like You| 101. The use of personal pionouns without specifying their 
referents, according to the sociologist Basil Bernstein, is a sign of an excessive 
dependence on context characteristic of working-class speakers of ' restricted 
code'; interestingly, this suggestion is not based on empirical evidence but on an 
example fabricated by a co-researcher; thus Bernstein is operating with an 
essentially flctional model[llJ. 
The fact that the three texts I have referred to all come many years after the 
publication of The Sound and the Fury is not especially damaging: I am not, in 
this paper, discussing sources and influences, direct historical influence of one 
specific text upon another. I could readily find earlier instantes of all four 
constructions with comparable cognitive significances (in older Gothic, na'ive 
poetry, diaries and letters of poorly educated people, etc.), but the point is to show 
that there exist for the modern reader established modes of discourse for the 
characterization of naíve consciousness and which guide her/him towards the 
interpretation which I have suggested. This is the only basis on which the 
contemporary critic can begin to read a text. Later stages of critical practice can, 
and perhaps ought to be, more strictly historical. Faulkner is building a specific 
model of idiocy, as, in the other sections of the novel, he is constituting other 
types of consciousness. The moral relationships between these points of view are 
of course the central concern of the fiction: Faulkner is juxtaposing modes of 
discourse to involve readers in a practice of evaluation. What l i t e ra ry , 
psychological and sociological diseourses went to mould and articúlate his 
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models of deviant personalities is a question in historical sociolinguistics and 
pragmatics which I am not competen! to answer without a great deal of research. 
But the research would be a kind of historical criticism of discourse and valúes. 
Critics may find it comforting that such research is compatible with the present 
theory of language -though of course not with previous formalist conceptions of 
linguistics stylistics. 
Let me add a brief pedagogical and methodological conclusión. The theory of 
literature as language as I have articulated it is congruent with the elementary 
observations that students'critical performance, ability to Nread' in the sense of 
realising text as significant discourse, is very much dependent on how much and 
what they have read. Because reading and criticism depend on knowledge of 
discourse, not ability to dissect text structurally, it should not be expected that 
teaching formal linguistic analysis to beginning literature students will in itself 
produce any great advance in critical aptitude. However, linguistics of the kind 
indicated in this paper, with sociolinguistics, discourse analysis and pragmatics, 
in the context of a literature course of decent length -in our case three years- is 
very effective. In this type of course students mature gradually in their 
command of modes of literary discourse, simultaneously gaining a theoretical 
knowledge of language and its use, and an analytic method and terminology with 
which to describe the relationships between linguistic structures and their 
functions in v literary' discourses. Finally, since discourse knowledge is formed 
for the individual in social structure, this approach is best taught and discussed 
in seminar groups rather than lectures and tutorials: thus experience of 
discourse can be shared. 
Underlying this comments on linguistic criticism in literary education are my 
answers to some basic methodological -or meta-methodological- questions which 
were implicit in my opening discussion. These have to do with whether linguistic 
criticism is objective. The linguistic description of structures in texts is 
certainly objective, particularly at the levéis of syntax and phonology (semantic 
description produces less agreement among linguists.) But it is clear that the 
assignment of functions or significances is not an objective process, because of the 
noted lack of co-variation of form and function. This does not mean that 
interpretation is a purely subjective, individual practice (a desperate and 
anarchic position into which those critics who stress the primacy of individual 
experience argüe themselves.) Criticism is an intersubjective practice. The 
significances which an individual critic assigns are the product of social con-
stitution; cultural meanings coded in the discourses in which the critic is 
competent. It is understandable, then, that critical interpretation is a matter of 
public discussion and debate; linguistic description, allowing clear descriptions of 
structures and a theory of social semiotic, is of fundamental importance in 
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